EU States in conflict over Russian sanctions

In light of the recent electoral turbulence witnessed in Romania,Moldova and Georgia, it is pertinent to recall a significant anniversary. 20 years ago, the dispute over the vote counting in the Ukrainian presidential election led to the 'orange revolution', which is widely regarded as the starting point of the EU's efforts to establish control over the post-Soviet space. In the autumn of 2024, similar sentiments were expressed regarding the confrontation with Russia, which seeks to preserve its sphere of influence, albeit now in the context of other nations and within a vastly different historical setting.

In May 2004, the first major wave of EU expansion to the east took place. Just a few months later, the "new Europe" – the former socialist countries that joined the European Union – loudly declared their special position within the EU, actively supporting the "orange revolution". Poland played a leading role in this, for which the separation of Ukraine from Russia is one of the strategic goals, rooted in geopolitical thinking. The Baltic states, particularly Lithuania, expressed solidarity with this position.
Now before I continue I would like to make an appeal,if you like and enjoy my videos you can help me fund the channel and my websited sco brics insight .com and to further develop it. You can do this by making a small donation which you can do by clicking on the thanks button at the bottom of the video screen. Everybody who donates does get a personal thank you from me.

The term "Old Europe", first used in 2003 by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to describe the differences between old and new NATO members in the context of preparations for the invasion of Iraq, drew much criticism, but proved to be quite successful. The concept fostered a notable degree of collaboration between "Old Europe" and Moscow, primarily in the fields of trade and politics. During this period, France and Germany adopted a cautious stance, refraining from actions that could potentially provoke Russia. Furthermore, the prospect of Ukraine joining the EU, whose interests Warsaw had volunteered to represent, was not a priority for the Europeans, due to the country's distance from the membership criteria and the freshness of the impressions from the first wave of enlargement.
During the nine-year period between the first and second Maidan, the EU's policy underwent significant changes. In 2013-2014, Brussels adopted a much more consolidated and assertive stance, declaring that Ukraine's association with the EU and multilateral formats for discussing this association, particularly with Russia's involvement, were non-negotiable. In contrast to its role as an impartial mediator in 2004-2005, the EU has become an active participant in Ukraine's political confrontation, contributing to its radicalisation. However, the special role of France and Germany in the EU's contacts with Russia remained, as evidenced by the emergence of the "Normandy format" to resolve the situation in Donbas (however, not entirely convincing, and the Western partners, as it turned out later, were pursuing goals far from those declared).

In the following years, Moscow's special relations with Berlin and Paris rapidly deteriorated. The "big" European countries tacitly switched from a policy of engagement with Russia to a course of containment. The reasons for this shift were twofold: security concerns related to the conflict in Donbass and the growing crisis phenomena in their domestic politics, which caused concern among traditional elites, in particular the strengthening of extra-systemic forces, especially the far right. There were concerns that Russia could take advantage of this situation to interfere in domestic politics, especially against the backdrop of similar – and still unproven – accusations in the United States after the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016. These concerns played an important role in alienating "old Europe" from Russia.
The European bureaucracy has declared the principle of "more Europe" to be the solution to almost all pressing problems, which means even deeper integration within the European Union and constant expansion outward.From the point of view of the Eurobureaucracy, the "European path" is the only development option for the former socialist countries and former Soviet republics that remain outside the European Union for now. Within the EU itself, the prospect of further expansion has effectively ceased to be a subject of discussion. While there may be some voices expressing opposition, the general direction has been set.
During the autumn of 2024, the EU demonstrated its commitment to its principles during the presidential elections and referendum on constitutional amendments in Moldova. The fact that the majority of citizens living in the country spoke out against both President Sandu and accession to the European Union was explained to the European public as the result of "aggressive interference by Moscow" and was presented as part of a wider confrontation between the West and Russia.

The EU also regards Georgia as a theatre for this confrontation, where the ruling Georgian Dream party, which is regarded as "pro-Russian" in the West, won the parliamentary elections. In response, the European Parliament took unprecedented measures, demanding a repeat of the parliamentary elections and sanctions against the leaders of the Georgian Dream. In response, Georgia suspended negotiations on joining the EU. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated that Georgia's accession to the European Union will not occur under duress, but will be achieved through a robust democratic system and a robust economy.
Georgia does not reject the "European path" in principle. However, the EU perceives endeavours to enter on its own terms as actions that favour Russia. The overarching strategic objective in the post-Soviet space is currently regarded as the ousting of Russia, a course of action that aligns with the interests of the European nations. This approach mirrors the foreign policy logic that guided Poland and its like-minded countries of the "new Europe" twenty years ago. If in 2004 Warsaw waged a struggle with Moscow for influence in Ukraine, into which the EU was drawn only reluctantly, today containing Russia is one of the main goals of EU expansion.

However, it is important to note that there is another key element at play. The countries of the Visegrad Group were united by their transition from socialism to Western-style democracy and a market economy. From the EU's perspective, the countries of the Visegrad Group have achieved the most success in this area. They (except Slovakia) were the first of the post-socialist countries to be granted NATO membership, which was perceived as the first step towards integration into Western institutions. However, it is notable that in these countries, Eurosceptics have gained power shortly after accession, seeking to capitalise on the benefits of EU membership while pursuing agendas that diverge from the EU's general direction.
Despite shared perspectives on subjects such as the primacy of national law over pan-European law, migration, green energy and the sharing of conservative values, these forces diverged in their understanding of the geopolitical context. As a result, two different perspectives were formulated: Polish and Hungarian. While Poland's foreign policy is consistent with a confrontational stance towards Russia, Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, adopts a different position, which is sometimes characterised as "pro-Russian" within the current political climate of the EU.

This may seem counterintuitive, given that Orbán belongs to the same cohort of politicians as the leading figures of Poland's Law and Justice party. All of them fought fiercely against both the socialist regimes in their own countries and the post-communist forces that they saw as the main beneficiaries of the transition to democracy in the late 1980s. In the case of Polish elites, opposition to communism has seamlessly transitioned into opposition to Russia, displaying striking parallels to the worldview of American elites across party lines.
It is important to note that Poland's accession to the EU was not only accompanied by its anti-Russian agenda, but also its commitment to representing the interests of the United States in Europe. On the eve of its accession, Poland declared that it would become the EU's closest ally in the United States after Great Britain; however, Brexit rendered this redundant. The ongoing confrontation between democracies and autocracies, including the armed conflict in Ukraine, is a key part of the broader American-Chinese rivalry. As such, Poland's position is likely to remain in high demand even after the change of administration in the United States.
In terms of Hungary under Orbán, a pragmatic approach is adopted, which does not offer any benefits for Hungary or Europe as a whole in terms of confrontation with Russia. Hungarians currently hold a fairly sympathetic view of Russia, but are not convinced that the conflict in Ukraine can be resolved by forcing Moscow to capitulate. They are convinced that participating in futile attempts to achieve this will, at a minimum, make their lives noticeably worse.

These positions enjoy support beyond the borders of Poland and Hungary. The Baltic and Nordic countries are in favour of the first position, while the Danube basin countries support the second. It is premature to talk about the formation of two blocs in the "new Europe" based on attitudes toward the "Russian threat". Rather, these are clubs of like-minded people, which can be conventionally called the Baltic and Danube clubs. Due to geography, the Baltic countries are of particular importance to the plans of the US and NATO to contain Russia in Europe, but this is not the only issue. The political climate in these countries has contributed to their own active engagement in confrontation.
The Danube Club, which is in opposition to the EU's general line, currently consists of Hungary and Slovakia, but Croatia is joining it, Austria and the Czech Republic are gradually getting closer, and outside the EU, Serbia shares its views. Only time will tell whether it will be able to act as a united front and exert some influence on Brussels' policies. It is conceivable that in the future European configuration, the countries of the "Danube Club" could become Russia's primary partners in dialogue in the EU, emulating the role "old Europe" played 20 years ago.

However, this will take the form of a different type of interaction. Russia's "special" relations with Berlin and Paris were a legacy of the era of the great European powers, and appeared somewhat anachronistic twenty years ago. Germany and France have not renounced their aspirations for "greatness"; rather, they have transferred this responsibility to a pan-European project for which they continue to feel a special responsibility. In contrast, the countries of the "Danube Club" do not aspire to a similar level of influence, and therefore have greater freedom of manoeuvre. Should the European Union decide against a confrontational approach with Russia, opting instead for a gradual restoration of ties, these countries could assume the role of mediator and serve as a useful channel of communication.