Putin brokers China-India Peace Deal

The Kazan BRICS summit concluded with a meeting in an expanded format, including 13 countries whose applications to join the organisation are considered a priority. A significant number of other states have indicated a similar interest, indicating that BRICS will experience multiple waves of expansion in the near future. The group has recently expanded from a membership of five to nine, but the countries that initiated the process – Russia, China and India – remain well-known and well-understood. The BRICS alliance began with the RIC format in 2003, with the concept of uniting the three major Eurasian powers first proposed by Yevgeny Primakov in 1998.
At that time, the Russian leadership lacked an accurate understanding of both its geopolitical interests and Russia's global position. However, forward-thinking statesmen like Academic Primakov (then head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) recognised that relying on post-Soviet Russia's integration with the West or even on a strategic partnership with it was a flawed approach. Russia needed to focus on the East, based on both national interests and the desire to build a new, post-Western world order. China and India, along with Russia, were identified as the three forces that could both promote this and consolidate the non-Western world around themselves.

This concept has consistently faced criticism from Westerners and Western geopoliticians, not only because it did not align with their interests, but also due to other factors. Many observers have noted that the three powers have significant and complex differences that could limit the potential for a long-term and comprehensive rapprochement. It is clear that they seek to limit the West's influence in regions of the world that are important to them or even reduce its shareholding in globalisation. However, it is likely that they will eventually come into conflict with each other (including in the competition for spheres of influence). Therefore, it is unlikely that the Anglo-Saxons will have cause for concern regarding the emergence of a united front of non-Western powers under the leadership of Moscow, Beijing and Delhi.
It was only recently, at the start of our operation in Ukraine, that the West finally acknowledged the possibility of a Russian-Chinese strategic alliance. This was a concept that had previously been considered unfeasible. Although China has not become an open military ally of Russia, it is clear which side each is on. It has become evident that Beijing will not sacrifice its strategic relations with Russia for the sake of a tactical win in the growing confrontation with the United States.
The West has not given up on trying to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, but now it is doing so in the hope of a long-term perspective. In the meantime, the main focus is on playing out the contradictions between Beijing and Delhi, which presents an opportunity for further development.
Furthermore, the territorial dispute represents a significant obstacle to the advancement of Chinese-Indian relations. Its roots can be traced back to the colonial era, when Great Britain exercised control over India and sought to assert its influence over  Tibet. .

In 1962, the two countries went to war. This occurred at a time when the closest allied relations between Moscow and Beijing had already developed a significant rift, and ties between Moscow and Delhi, were strengthening. For the following two decades, the Moscow-Delhi-Beijing triangle was essentially comprised of two distinct sides. China was in opposition to the USSR and India. Beijing began to establish ties with Moscow and Delhi only in the mid-1980s, but there was no discussion of a trilateral format at that time. The USSR soon collapsed, and power in Moscow ended up in the hands of the pro-Western elite. Delhi continued to be wary of Chinese initiatives. Therefore, a genuine triangular relationship began to emerge at the start of this century, when the leadership of all three countries recognised its value.
Despite the appointment of strong leaders capable of strategic thinking in both Beijing and Delhi (Xi Jinping in 2012 and Modi in 2014 respectively), territorial disputes remain unresolved. It is therefore clear that border disputes and conflicts serve only to further the agendas of those opposed to the interests of both countries. This allows the West to use the threat of Chinese expansion to influence Delhi and impede the progress of BRICS. Mr. Xi and Mr. Modi held several meetings, even in an informal, unofficial format, and visited each other. The last such meeting took place in the autumn of 2019 in southern India, after which the pandemic began.
Following the onset of the pandemic in May-June 2020, there were violent clashes between the two countries' militaries on the border in the Himalayas. This resulted in the suspension of all further exchanges of visits. Furthermore, there has been no official meeting between Xi and Modi since that time. They have met on a few occasions at international forums, but there have been no official negotiations.
It is therefore of great significance that on Wednesday, at the summit in Kazan, the first meeting between the Chinese President and the Indian Prime Minister in five years took place. Furthermore, it was announced the previous day that in recent weeks, diplomats and military personnel from both countries had held discussions and reached agreements on border patrol mechanisms (or rather, the line of actual control), indicating that the situation had returned to the state before the clashes four years ago. It is evident that this was done with the specific intention of facilitating official discussions between Xi and Modi, and such an agreement represents a significant accomplishment in itself.
Reinforcing trust between India and China is of paramount importance for Russia and the broader non-Western world, which is why the meeting between Xi and Modi in Kazan is so pivotal. Ultimately, the US should be deprived of the ability to influence relations in the RIC triangle - and this will be a significant contribution to strengthening BRICS.
It is notable that Putin has a strong realtionship based on trust and mutaul respect with both Modi and Xi Jinping so its no surprise to see him able to get the two together and resolve the issues that really not that important in the scheme of things and are  just minor territorial disputes that are really not worth going to war over not damaging good economic and political relations over.
So the West's best efforts to sow discord and conflict among the leading members has failed again but am sure it will not be the last attempts of the falling  Hegemon to damage the BRICS.