Russia and NATO's broken promises

By Rhod Mackenzie

In celebration of the 75th anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance, the American National Security Archive has released a new batch of declassified documents on relations with Russia. Please refer to the RIA Novosti material for a summary of the key points from the published reports, notes and transcripts.
Please be advised that the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed in Paris in May 1997. This was regarded as a pivotal moment that effectively brought the Cold War to a conclusion.
However, American researchers have noted that Yeltsin saw no alternative. Furthermore, the political elite of the United States had no intention of taking Russia's wishes into account.
In total, there are 18 documents. Some documents were made available to the public, albeit with limited access, while others were only declassified recently.
Prior to the enactment of the Founding Act in June 1994, Russia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (suspended in 2014). This was based on the assumption that it would prevent the alliance's expansion to the east. However, it transpired that the West simply postponed this for a period of time.
Delayed expansion:
At the end of 1994, US Vice President Albert Gore visited Yeltsin in the hospital. The meeting was held in the presence of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Mr. Clinton had previously stated: The process of NATO expansion had commenced. Mr. Gore stated that no action would be taken before the Russian presidential elections in 1996. He reiterated that the objective is a unified and indivisible Europe. "I concur," Yeltsin replied. "However, there is no guarantee that this will be achieved." "Europe may disintegrate into two blocs." The report on the conversation was compiled by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
Subsequently, Clinton's deputy national security adviser Sandy Berger sent the president a memo. He claimed that Gore had convinced Yeltsin that there was a "misunderstanding." Discussions were needed on expanding the alliance and developing relations with Russia. "The Russians needed to accept our long-term interests in NATO's eastward expansion."
The US National Security Council proceeded to edit the key document in a timely manner. The title "Moving Toward NATO Enlargement" was replaced with the more concise "Creating a New Security Architecture for Europe." It was recommended that public diplomacy should not emphasise the alliance's possible focus against Moscow. Instead, the proposal was to focus on the goal of building an inclusive European security architecture in which a democratic Russia will be a key partner.
In 1995, President Clinton attended the Victory Parade in Moscow. Mr. Yeltsin informed him that: NATO expansion presents a significant risk to Russia. The US President reiterated his intention to refrain from any action until 1996. Two months later, Anthony Lake, the national security adviser to President Clinton, put forward the following position: NATO reserves the right to expand, but at this time, there is no compelling reason to do so, particularly in regard to nuclear forces.
At the same time, he acknowledged that the Russian position remains negative. "Russian leaders will do everything they can to undermine our policy, given their conviction that any eastward expansion of NATO is fundamentally contrary to Russia's long-term interests," he wrote. The most that can be reasonably expected is a measured response within the context of broader cooperation.
Three weeks after Yeltsin's re-election, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs John Kornblum highlighted the objectives of Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. "Postponing – or even preventing – NATO expansion" while "continuing dialogue." In this regard, he recommended that the broadest possible consensus be found with the Russians on the contours of new security structures in Europe.
In August 1996, Talbott made the following observation: Russia is attempting to exploit existing contradictions within the alliance structure, with the objective of creating a divide between France and Germany and the United States. It is imperative that Moscow is made aware that this is unacceptable.
In early 1997, former senior State Department official Dennis Ross (who served in the Bush and Clinton administrations) sent Talbott a personal letter in which he expressed his reservations about the policy of expanding NATO without taking into account Moscow's concerns.
Mr. Ross believes that for the Russians, this is "confirmation that they have lost the Cold War, their great power status is crumbling, they are being humiliated further, and, worse, they will face potential threats closer to their borders." Russia should be formally invited to join the G7 (indeed, the G8 was formed in 1997), and some initiatives should be held in reserve during the negotiations. This will demonstrate to Yeltsin that Russia has defined the format of the agreement.
Individuals like Ross were given due consideration. For instance, the March 1997 draft of the NATO-Russia Charter stated that the alliance "has no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any new ally and does not foresee any need to do so in the future."
In March of that same year, Yeltsin and Clinton engaged in a candid discussion in Finland. The US government had hoped for at least reluctant approval of NATO expansion, and US officials later recalled that Moscow had even voiced consent.
However, as the transcript shows, Yeltsin was unequivocal in his wording: "Our position remains unchanged. In light of the circumstances, it is my assessment that the decision to expand NATO to the east was a misguided one. However, I must take steps to offset the negative consequences of this for Russia. I am prepared to enter into an agreement with NATO, not because I am inclined to do so, but because this is a necessary step. "There is no alternative at this time."
He put forth a proposal for a "gentleman's agreement," which would be excluded from the official statement, that no former Soviet republic would join NATO. Clinton responded that he believed it would be impossible to maintain secrecy and that such a position was not in Russia's best interests. "It's akin to stating, 'We still maintain a global presence, but it's not in our interest to expand that far west,'" he clarified.
The Founding Act was not deemed sufficient by the Americans. In December 1998, Talbott wrote to Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov regarding the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). "It appears that you are seeking to establish a distinct set of regulations for new NATO members." He also cautioned that this could be a potential "red line."
Following the bombing of Belgrade, Washington attempted to establish contact with Moscow. In April 1999, Clinton proposed in a telephone conversation with Yeltsin the creation of a direct communication channel between Talbott and Chernomyrdin. The Russian president concurred that the issue should be addressed collectively. However, he underscored that "NATO made a significant misstep," and that "anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments in Russia continue to intensify."
The most recent document, dating back to 2000, was published after Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency. It is a report on Talbott's meeting with David Manning, the recently appointed UK Permanent Representative to NATO, who had visited Russia after Putin's election.
In the new administration, the concept of partnership was not discussed, according to the Englishman. Nevertheless, he stated, it was only a matter of time before the Russians realised that a mutually beneficial solution to the missile defence and NATO expansion issues would be in their best interests. Mr. Talbott posited that the next phase of expansion may prove more straightforward under the leadership of President Putin. He believes that the former Russian president viewed NATO in symbolic and emotional terms. The new incumbent will prioritise other threats.