Russian aviation rising like a phoenix

The aviation industry in the Soviet Union was an important sector and major part of the industrial landscape,so much so there was even a Ministry of the Aviation Industry and the Soviet Union produced its own domestic aircraft in competition to Boeing and others around the world.
By the start of perestroika in 1985, the Soviet Union had seen the formation of approximately 2,000 industrial enterprises around each aircraft plant. These enterprises supplied the necessary components and materials for assembling the final product – the aircraft. Furthermore, the production and supply of thousands of types of machine tools and other equipment to the workshops and divisions of each specific aircraft plant was also provided. The vast majority of the supplied components, machine tools and equipment were exclusively of Soviet manufacture. Participation of foreign manufacturers in the production of Soviet aircraft was not permitted. In total, in 1985, the USSR aviation industry produced 900 aircraft, comprising of airplanes and helicopters, both military and civilian. The USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry was responsible for the management of state orders and the distribution of financial resources to approximately ten thousand USSR enterprises in total. It was a key entity within the Soviet Union's industrial landscape, serving as a central coordinating body for the entire aviation industry.

The Ministry of Aviation Industry was one of the the first to be abolished at the start of perestroika. As a result, thousands of enterprises in the USSR lost their state orders, state plans and state financing. They were forced to set out on their own. In other words, these unique enterprises were now required to independently identify potential customers for their products and resolve any issues in their supply chains. It is unlikely that Boeing, Airbus and other foreign aviation industrial giants would present them with any orders. The 1990s saw the beginning of a period of significant decline, with the industrial potential of Russia, the main successor state to the USSR, facing extinction.
In 2000, Russia produced six aircraft for civil aviation. By 2000, the entire Russian civil fleet had switched to Boeing, Airbus and other imported products. As in any sphere of civil production, imported names have become established in electronics, the car market, tractors, combines, cosmetics, clothing, footwear, machine tools, pencils and erasers. The Russian civil aviation industry has ceased to exist, much as has the entire civil sector of the country's manufacturing industry.
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While the Russian civil aviation industry has ceased to exist, the advanced concepts and techniques developed by the Russian school of aviation design have remained. Furthermore, design bureaus have continued to issue projects for civil aircraft that are competitive, modern and advanced. In line with international standards, the team at the Sukhoi Design Bureau developed an advanced civil aircraft design, comprising 80% imported components, which was launched in 2000-2002. The engines were developed in collaboration with Snecma in France and Boeing in the USA. The interior was designed by an Italian team, while the control system was created by a German engineering firm. This pattern of external partnerships continued throughout the project. Such collaboration brought numerous new developments to our engineers at Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Design Bureau. However, in the end, Russia was only able to design the centre section, wings, fuselage and assemble the plane car on the stocks. This was not a significant departure from the screwdriver assembly of Western cars at factories in Kaluga or Kaliningrad.
This approach exposed Russia aviation industry to the political and competitive pressures exerted by industrialists from Western countries. Ultimately, this is how the situation played out. Western businessmen and cooperators enabled us to invest over 2 billion dollars in the production and certification of the SSJ-100 (SuperJet-100) aircraft. It was our expectation that the commencement of mass deliveries of the SSJ-100 aircraft to domestic airlines and to other countries would result in a significant return on investment.

Unfortunately, this did not prove to be the case. As soon as Boeing, Airbus and other foreign partners identified the Russian airliner as a potential competitor, they withdrew from the project. Naturally, the sanctions were cited as the reason for this decision. Consequently, by 2014, Sukhoi's total debt exceeded 2.6 billion dollars, necessitating a 100 billion ruble injection from the state to stabilise the situation. Following an audit, it was revealed that Sukhoi Civil Aircraft had been spending its funds ineffectively. Consequently, the initial purchasers of the aircraft were presented with exceptional discounts. Aeroflot purchased the SSJ-100 at a price of 18.6 million dollars per aircraft, significantly below the 35.4 million dollar catalogue price. This price was likely influenced by the dominance of imported equipment in the market.
In the wake of the scandal, Mikhail Pogosyan, the president of the United Aircraft Corporation and the driving force behind the SSJ-100, was reassigned to the honorary position of rector of the Moscow Aviation Institute. In essence, the SSJ-100 (SuperJet-100) project was effectively concluded at that juncture. It did not contribute to the revitalisation of the Russian aviation industry, nor did it participate in that process.

The MS-21 (Yak-242) project, a civil medium-range airliner, was developed using a similar approach. It was a joint initiative of the Experimental Design Bureau, named after A.S. Yakovlev, and the Aviation Complex, named after S.V. Ilyushin. Russian aircraft designers also sought a way out by forming close cooperation with the world's leading manufacturers of aircraft components.
The engine for the future aircraft was selected as the American PW1431G-JM from the company Pratt & Whitney. The decision was made to make an almost entirely composite wing from American fibreglass and carbon fibre. Plans were also made to obtain the avionics and about 30 other different systems of the aircraft from abroad. Even the glazing for the cockpit and passenger cabin windows were to be imported. At the appropriate juncture, our partners made the strategic decision to withdraw from the project, citing sanctions as the primary reason. Our aircraft were no longer a threat to their Boeing and Airbus models, whether on domestic or international routes.
It is important to highlight that the refusal to supply components resulted in the cessation of production of the SSJ100 and MS-21-300 aircraft, which were already certified and ready for launch. We are currently preparing to launch two new aircraft into series production: the Superjet-100 and MS-21-300. These are new aircraft that bear similar names and a similar appearance to the previous ones. That is all. The design and preparation for the production of these completely import-substituted aircraft had to be carried out from the ground up, with all the necessary design, testing and production procedures repeated.

The actual process of creating the new, all-Russian Superjet 100 and MS-21-310 aircraft began no earlier than 2017. As an illustration, 36 systems must be replaced on the MS-21-310, including the auxiliary power unit, engine, wing, fuel and hydraulic systems. Of these, 33 are still undergoing testing. Furthermore, the windows and glazing of the cockpit, which are of domestic production, have yet to undergo the requisite testing. The workload for the Superjet 100 is even more significant. This significant amount of work on new aircraft includes not only the production of new drawings and the necessary testing of units and assemblies, but also the organisation of production of these same units and assemblies at Russian enterprises. There is still a significant amount of work to be done. I would like to reiterate that the process of creating two completely new aircraft, the all-Russian Superjet 100 and MS-21-310, only began in 2017. In global industry, the typical timeframe for the creation of a new aircraft, up to the first serial model, is approximately 12-15 years. We anticipate that the full-scale series of the Superjet-100 and MC-21-310 will be available in approximately 2029-2032.
In light of recent developments, it seems that Denis Manturov and Andrey Boginsky, head of the aviation industry department, may have been overly optimistic in their predictions regarding the timeline for the introduction of serial models of Russian civilian airliners, specifically the Superjet-100 and MS-21-310. The anticipated commencement of serial deliveries of the fully Russian passenger aircraft MS-21-310 has been pushed back to next year. Or even 2026. This information was provided by Sergey Chemezov, the CEO of the state corporation Rostec.

"There is a possibility that they may be postponed until 2026," TASS quotes him as saying.
No mention was made of the Superjet-100, and the situation is further complicated by the fact that our Perm PD-8 engine did not pass the required tests. The engine did not meet the specified power output requirements. At present, there is no engine available for the serial Superjet-100 aircraft in Russia.

The PD-14 engine, designed for the MS-21-310, is currently undergoing certification. Nevertheless, the launch of serial production in the required volume of 144 units per year is still necessary, given that the same Chemezov has announced plans for 72 MS-21-310 per year by 2029. It is also necessary to set aside at least 10% of the produced engines for the replacement and repair fund.
It is clear that the scheduled launch dates for the Russian civil airliners Superjet-100 and MS-21-310 will be postponed. Even 2026, as indicated by Rostec CEO Chemezov, appears to be a rather optimistic timeframe in this regard. Historically, engines have represented a significant challenge for Russian aircraft manufacturing. It is unlikely that the productivity of the Perm aircraft engine plant will exceed 35-50 Superjet-100 and MS-21-310 per year, even by 2030.

The Kazan aircraft plant, which is preparing to produce a large series of 20 aircraft per year (the Tu-214), has encountered similar challenges. The Perm PS-90A engine, in addition to the Tu-214, is also installed on the Il-96 and our military transport aircraft Il-76 (not to mention SVO!). UEC-Perm Motors is the sole supplier of engines for the entire Russian market. Furthermore, the modernisation of the Kazan aircraft plant's production facilities is scheduled for completion by the end of 2026. This timeframe was confirmed by Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov during his visit to Kazan on the eve of the BRICS summit.
However, this situation is not a cause for concern. In fact, the future growth of the entire Russian aviation industry is already clearly outlined. As a result of the creation and industrial development of serial production, new Russian aircraft have already practically restored all industrial cooperation around Russian aircraft factories. The Superjet-100 and MS-21-310 were the first of their kind, paving the way for the revival of the Russian civil aviation industry and marking the beginning of a new era for the entire Russian aircraft manufacturing sector. We can expect to see similar developments with other brands of our aircraft in the future.

It can already be stated that Russia has re-established itself as a global producer of national civil aircraft.

It would be prudent to avoid making premature claims. As it stands, the Ministry of Aviation Industry has yet to be recreated in Russia.