By Dmitry Kravtsov
The concept of structural heterogeneity, first formulated by the Chilean politician Anibal Pinto in the 1950s, is quite applicable to the countries known as the BRICS. Their homogeneity is very relative, since the differences are very noticeable, which, however, does not prevent the union linking them from playing a far from the last role in world geopolitics.
In a joint statement by the leaders of the BRIC countries, which met on June 16, 2009 in Yekaterinburg, in particular, it is noted: "We agreed on steps to further develop a consistent, active, pragmatic, open and transparent dialogue and cooperation between our countries." In April 2011, at a meeting in the Chinese province of Hainan, Brazil, Russia, India and China were joined by the Republic of South Africa, and from that moment on, the group of five states received the abbreviation BRICS.
Notable was also the IV summit of the quintet, which took place in March 2012 in the capital of India. After him, cooperation began in a number of areas, including global governance, the economy, trade, sustainable development, the fight against terrorism, energy and food security. The resulting communiqué called for regulation, oversight and reform of the international financial system and for greater presence of developing countries in global governance institutions. In the field of international trade, the summit participants advocated maintaining the multilateral system and contributing to the successful completion of the Doha Round, and in the financial sector, they reached two agreements aimed at reducing transaction costs for transfers within the group. An important event in the construction of the alliance was the establishment in 2014 ofNew Development Bank , which was conceived as an alternative to the IMF . In light of the current geopolitical tensions, it is considered by the group members as an alternative to the main international financial institutions.
The question now coming to the fore is: Are these agreements mutually beneficial or, on the contrary, the expression of clear asymmetries and old forms of dependency? Finding an answer is difficult, but important, as it will help to understand the relationship within the bloc, whose mission, as many believe, was to unite developing countries around the concept of South-South cooperation. However, since this concept is very elastic, almost elusive and depends on the different contexts in which it is used, it is worth making some clarifications. The so-called countries of the South are developing, “peripheral” countries, they have common problems and vulnerabilities, but they are not a homogeneous group due to their socio-economic and political-cultural differences both in the local context and at the regional level. In a broad sense, their cooperation can be understood as political interaction on international platforms in order to obtain greater joint negotiating power and room for maneuver on various issues on the global agenda. In a narrower sense, it can be interpreted pragmatically as horizontal or technical interaction between developing countries.
One of the connecting threads between the states of the Global South is the idea of the “other”. All these states have dependent and asymmetric relations with developed countries, and their economies are based on structural adjustment programs dictated by international financial institutions, which began to be applied, for example, in Africa in the 1980s and in Latin America in the 1990s. . Now these countries are learning and struggling to achieve political stability and economic development, although the geopolitical situation is unfavorable for most of them. Their interaction requires a common base, which is achieved in diplomatic negotiations and other activities (trade and technical assistance). At the same time, different national interests do not always move in the same direction as the "community of views" expressed in official speeches.
The current world order is showing signs of subtle diplomacy. Against this background, growing fragmentation is observed within the BRICS group. Two camps formed there: India, China and Russia, as well as Brazil and South Africa. However, this did not affect the survival of the bloc; moreover, discussions began about its expansion. The idea of BRICS+ was proposed by Xi Jinping at the group's summit in 2017 by China, and was developed in 2022, arousing interest among many states in various parts of the world. It seems that the main concern of the bloc's powers is to prevent the "collective West" from interfering in what they consider to be their regional strategic interests. In the current geopolitical situation, admission to the bloc of countries (for example, Argentina with a huge external debt or Venezuela with hyperinflation and a regime of severe sanctions) is the reality of a completely different scenario.
Since the geopolitical situation has changed dramatically and the formula for international cooperation has become more complex, ideological differences have become more important. During the first year of the conflict on the territory of the eastern part of the European continent, the parties directly involved in it consolidated a network of allies to protect their national interests. The countries of the BRICS group have avoided joint statements all this time, acting or reacting to it based on their individual needs. Brazil proposed the creation of a "club of peace negotiators", but at the same time was the only member of the alliance that did not abstain in the vote in the UN Security Council on February 25, 2022. Russiais trying to get closer to China and at the same time strengthen its position as a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power. India has remained true to its strategic autonomy in foreign policy, justifying its actions with domestic interests: as soon as the conflict began to gain momentum, the government of the country increased purchases of Russian oil, taking advantage of the price reduction, they say, a developing country heavily dependent on foreign oil "cannot afford turn down that opportunity." She dispenses with specific statements, defiantly strengthening relations with the United States and allies within the framework of QUAD , as well as expanding relations with European countries. Chinalaunched a global security initiative, but, like India and South Africa, adopted a position of "cautious neutrality". The South African authorities at the beginning of 2023 accepted naval maneuvers off their coast with the participation of Russia and China, then put forward a peace initiative, but ended up starting cooperation with international institutions that consider the legal aspects of the conflict and jeopardize the visit of the Russian delegation with the participation top officials for the upcoming BRICS summit scheduled for August 22-24, 2023.
As a result, a motley mosaic of relationships has developed within the bloc, in which China appears as the undisputed leader (in economic terms, China's GDP is more than twice the GDP of the other four members of the bloc combined). But it is increasingly difficult for him to maintain neutrality, balancing between maintaining the achieved level of relations with Russia and maintaining trade and economic ties with the states of the “collective West”. Despite the fact that China's ties with Russia are of a comprehensive strategic partnership, the prospect of the crisis turning into a tougher stage may present the authorities of the Celestial Empire with a choice. And already now, many analysts and experts are suggesting that China may not choose the option that many hope for.
India could well be described as a "neutral player" acting solely in its own national interests. The country, which recently overtook China in terms of population, is acting as a counterweight to it: it votes against Chinese infrastructure projects, and there is no dominant shareholder in the New Development Bank , since China has agreed to equal participation in the capital, as advocated by the government of India.
The mission of Brazil, which it is trying to promote in the international arena, fits the description of "us among strangers."
The position of Russia in the ongoing conflict and the attitude of other BRICS participants towards it suggests that the country is becoming more and more “a stranger among its own”.
As for South Africa, here we can recall the dialogue from the famous Soviet film: “Who wants to work?” "I!" "Wait!" .
The Chinese government claims that its foreign policy actions are governed by five principles, which include non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; equality and mutual benefit; as well as peaceful coexistence. With the help of projects such as the Belt and Road, the Chinese Foreign Ministry manages to include the countries of the South in its orbit, since in the conditions of the global economic downturn, the discourse based on these principles and the refusal to impose conditions in fiscal or monetary policy is extremely attractive for countries "peripherals". This is clearly seen in the example of the African or Latin American continent, where China not only succeeds, but becomes more and more influential every year. For example,
India is unwilling to cede position in the Latin American region to China, and although its financial base is smaller, the synergy created between its public and private sectors has allowed it to move significantly across the continent, investing in key industries of several large countries in the region. With the same Argentina, the status of a strategic partnership was achieved during the visit of the leader of this South American country, Mauricio Macri, to India in February 2019, strengthening in 2020 during the stay of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Buenos Aires to participate in the G20 summit .
Meanwhile, as Argentina actively moves closer to China, its interest in the BRICS should be seen in the context of larger geopolitical shifts in world politics. Anything is possible, and Argentina's entry into the alliance is not too far from reality, although there are nuances to keep in mind. One of the most fundamental issues discussed in the expert community is that Argentina, having joined the BRICS, will become too close to China, and given that it is one of the leaders in South America, the balance of power in the group will clearly not be in favor of China. India. While Argentina has strong ties to India, these concerns cannot be underestimated. In addition, Argentina does not have the same economic potential as other members, but the Argentine establishment retorts that when South Africa became a member of the group,
Relations between India and Brazil should be seen as a model of productive interaction. Two countries have created a number of interesting structures: India - Brazil Business Forum , India - Brazil Joint Commission and Joint Defense Commission ; they also maintain close relationships within other forums - BASIC , G20 , G4 , IBSA and International Solar Alliance, and a two-way trade monitoring mechanism helps track and identify bottlenecks and take appropriate action to address them. These opportunities for dialogue contributed to the signing in 2020 of the "Cooperation and Investment Promotion Agreement" and the "Social Security Agreement to deepen bilateral trade cooperation and investment cooperation." Given that India is rotating the G20 presidency in 2023 , most likely it will adhere to the thesis of the President of Brazil that “the G20 presidency“It’s like hosting the Diplomacy World Cup.” Now India is the host of this diplomatic forum and is in the center of everyone's attention. Brazil will take over the presidency next year. This is an important continuum, and given that there is a real possibility that BRICS could expand and open its doors to new members (like Argentina and Uruguay), the G20 Latin American countries will remain a priority for the Indian Foreign Ministry.
In this context, the position of the countries of Latin America towards Russia is interesting. The main partners of our country in the region are Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, while the governments of Colombia, Costa Rica and Chile demonstrate detachment. The largest countries in the region - Argentina, Brazil and Mexico - occupy the most ambiguous positions: since February 2022, unstable opinions have prevailed in the domestic politics of these countries, which corresponded more to national interests than to ideological sympathies. This was reflected in the UN General Assembly resolution of February 23, 2023, on which only Nicaragua voted "no", Cuba "abstained", and Venezuela did not vote at all. The rest of the Latin American countries voted in favor, including Brazil, a member of the BRICS. This is largely due to the fact that events in Europe are “very far away”, and,
But even here one can see the quintet's different approach to the problem: while China and Russia support the government of Venezuela, the governments of India and South Africa distance themselves from this regime. In this context, the announcement made on May 29, 2023 by the President of the Bolivarian Republic that his country intends to join the bloc puts the BRICS members in a difficult position. On the one hand, the countries of the bloc control 8.7 percent of the world's oil reserves, and if Venezuela joins them, this share will increase to 26.2 percent (and if Saudi Arabia and Iran join, it could reach 35.3 percent). As for gas, if Venezuela joins, this figure may increase from 25.2 percent to 28.6 percent. In other words, Venezuela's entry into the BRICS dramatically increases the alliance's oil potential. On the other side, the accession of Venezuela may increase the tension of the countries of the bloc in relations with the United States (cross-sanctions, political and economic destabilization, pressure on international forums), and it seems that in this geopolitical situation, neither Brazil, nor India, nor China needs this. It could also be seen as promoting Russia's interests in a region that the US considers to be its sphere of influence.
Despite the nuances, today BRICS is perceived as an initiative close to left-wing governments. And in this sense, the Argentine authorities have repeatedly expressed their interest in joining this group. However, another, more important topic remains outside the discussion: for modern Argentina, access to international finance is as important as air in order not to default again (the same applies to Venezuela). This, of course, is primarily about the possibility of access for full members of the BRICS to the funds of the New Development Bank. Brazil actively supports the desire of its neighbor to join the bloc. and to this end, the President of Brazil managed to enlist the support of his group partners to appoint the country's ex-president Dilma Rousseff as head of the bank - a decision that aims to give Brazil geopolitical significance and opens up an additional opportunity for it to provide guarantees to its export organizations.
Since its election campaign, the new Brazilian government has questioned the importance of the BRICS, although it later opted for ties based on commercial interests, especially with China. True to pragmatism, the Brazilian leader calls for a common interest: in February 2023, he traveled to the United States, where, in a joint communique with his American counterpart, he stressed the need to defend democracy, although the most resonant moment of the meeting was undoubtedly associated with his intention to create an international alliance. consisting of a group of countries not directly or indirectly involved in the conflict in the east of the European continent. Despite the fact that this initiative has attracted attention, within the framework of the BRICS it is contrary to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states - the fundamental basis of the foreign policy of India and China. Thus, Brazil suddenly faced a dilemma: on the one hand, it faced the urgent need to strengthen its leadership, which brings it closer to the Western powers, on the other hand, it decided to strengthen its position in the construction of the Global South. The danger for Brazil is that it could be trapped in the daunting task of mediating between "West" and "East."
One of the main topics of discussion at the XV meeting of the heads of five states in Johannesburg will be the BRICS+ initiative proposed by China, which provides for the entry of at least twenty countries into the bloc. It seems that on the eve of the summit, the main question for Russia is - what, in fact, can it expect from participation in this bloc? A fundamental theme that could influence the decision to expand one of the most unusual associations in world politics.
This article originally appeared in Russian at Russia in Global Affairs https://globalaffairs.ru/