Trump is Not Ronald Reagan and Russia not the USSR

On 23 January, three days after his inarguaration as the US President Donald Trump called on OPEC countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, to lower oil prices. He expressed surprise that they had not done so prior to the US elections. Trump's strategy involves using lower oil prices to persuade Russia to suspend the Special Military Operation and negotiate the fate of Ukraine, while maintaining leverage over Moscow.
The basis for this strategy is the hypothesis that lower prices, as experienced in the 1980s, had a negative effect on the Soviet Union. However, this theory is not supported by empirical evidence.Plus Donald Trump is No Ronald Reagan and Vladimir Putin is not Mikhail Gobachev and Russia is not the Soviet Union

Addressing the leaders of OPEC countries directly, Trump spoke in Davos. In addition to the "peacekeeping" aspect, his proposal also has an anti-inflationary element: following the decline in oil prices, the world's central banks may begin to reduce rates. If oil prices decrease, the threat of inflation will decrease, and central banks may be able to "loosen the reins" of monetary policy. The markets showed only moderate reaction. Oil prices experienced a 1-2% decline, but that was the extent of it.
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The question of whether this was part of a broader conspiracy similar to that between Reagan and King Fahd remains a point of interest.
It is possible that Trump's statements were influenced by the conspiracy theory that seems to think that the decisive act of the Cold War in the 1980s was the actions of then-US President Ronald Reagan, who convinced Saudi Arabia to radically increase production.
This, in turn, is said to have led to a significant drop in oil prices to below $10 per barrel (at current prices, this would equate to approximately $29 per barrel). This fall in prices was an unfortunate development for the Soviet Union at the time of perestroika, as petrodollars helped pay for vital imports (including high-tech ones).
The USSR's trade balance and budget began to deteriorate, which, among other factors (in the context of the theory, primarily) ultimately led to its collapse in 1991.
In Russia, this theory enjoyed widespread popularity among representatives of all political persuasions in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s–2010s, often being perceived as fact.In the US, it also attracted a number of supporters, including Reagan's adopted son Michael. More recently, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, Andriy Yermak, alluded to the theory, suggesting that the US should adopt a similar approach to support Ukraine.
A detailed account of this theory can be found in the book by political consultant Peter Schweitzer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Fall of the Soviet Union. Notably, it was highlighted that in 1981, during a visit to Riyadh, the CIA Director William Casey broached the subjects of US and Saudi Arabian security, as well as the potential for increasing Saudi oil production. According to Schweitzer, this interaction may have signalled the presence of a coordinated strategy at a later stage.
However, this theory does not align closely with the facts.Firstly, in 1981, prices were performing strongly, stabilising around their all-time high. While there was a slight decline in production in the following years, it was significantly less than the worst decline experienced in the second half of the decade.
However, OPEC's discipline at the time was not optimal, with many of its member countries attempting to circumvent the quota system by various means, resulting in a significant oversupply of oil. This behaviour led to a decline in OPEC's overall effectiveness, and all attempts by Saudi Arabia, the organisation's de facto leader, to restore discipline met with limited success.
If you examine the available data, you will see that the Saudis have been reducing their production for several years.

And not as dramatically as at present (a couple of million barrels below their record levels), but nevertheless in a sustained manner. From 1981 to 1986, the country's oil production fell from over 10 to less than 4 million barrels per day. A reversal occurred in 1986, following a scandal during a summit of representatives of the organization, where Iraq and Iran, which were at war, were warned for violating quotas. Riyadh grew weary of relying solely on its own efforts to raise global prices, leading it to increase production. However, there was no indication of a return to previous levels. Over the subsequent two years, production volumes rose to 5 million barrels per day, although this was still only half of the previous peak.

According to Schweitzer's theory, the Americans' response to Riyadh's actions could be divided into two possible scenarios: either they were pleased with the Saudi leadership's increased production, or they were outraged by their lack of decisiveness.
However, both assumptions are inaccurate. In reality, Reagan dispatched George Bush Sr. (then his vice president) on a mission to persuade Saudi Arabia to return to the status quo.
The reason for this mission is as follows: This was due to the damage that even modest efforts by the Saudis had inflicted on the American oil industry. This period witnessed a decline in the US oil industry, which continued until the late 2000s. Bush bluntly informed King Fahd that increasing Saudi production posed a direct threat to US national security.

It is also important to note that Soviet-American relations began to improve rapidly after the meetings between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, in Geneva and Reykjavik. Concurrently, Soviet oil production was at its zenith, a notable distinction from its American counterpart, which had been operating at a loss throughout the 1980s.
Despite the decline in prices, which was a significant blow to the Soviet economy, oil production remained at a plateau of 12 million barrels per day for the next few years, only beginning to decline in 1990. This decline was not solely attributed to the historic decline in oil prices, which occurred against the backdrop of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict, but rather to the broader crisis afflicting the Soviet economy.
While the USSR did experience a decline in oil prices in the second half of the 1980s, it would be inaccurate to attribute this solely as the primary cause of the Union's collapse, as there were numerous other contributing factors.
Furthermore, while Saudi Arabia did increase production, this was not a determining factor in the eventual decline. The notion of a coordinated effort or a "cunning plan" by Washington and Riyadh, as suggested, appears to be somewhat divorced from actual historical events. The Saudis increased production only slightly and were extremely reluctant to do so. The US was not at all delighted by this, rightly fearing the consequences for its own oil sector. The decisive factors in the decline in world prices were the development of energy conservation in the largest economies of the world, as well as the lack of discipline among the other OPEC countries.

The current situation is not th same as that of the 1980s, but there are some similarities. In both instances, there is a lack of strong incentives for either the US or Saudi Arabia to reduce prices.The Saudis have voluntarily limited their production for several years and continue to do so now, in order to balance the kingdom's current ambitious budgets, for which oil prices need to be at $100 per barrel.
In the US, falling prices pose significant challenges for their shale industry, as they did 40 years ago. Most fields are only profitable at a price point of at least $55-60 per barrel. This is evidenced by the fact that prices have remained at these levels or above since the pandemic. The plans for large-scale drilling and increased production in America will conflict with pressure on OPEC to reduce prices. In conclusion, it is evident that Trump's proposals are of a declaratory nature, lacking any tangible prospects.
So like a lot of Trump policies they are a lot of hot air