US Starts Global Energy War With Russia

By Rhod Mackenzie

For the Russian Federation, its oil and gas exports are of paramount importance. They are not merely a major component of the nation's balance of payments; they are the one of the cornerstones of the economy. Now If the European segment is being systematically replaced by American LNG and oil, and the eastern perimeter is being presurised on the likes of  India and China, then it would appear that the redistribution of flows is no longer the primary concern. Instead, it would seem that the objective is to deal a structural blow to the Russian export model.
It is my professional opinion that the current approach to energy policy in the United States is not aligned with the principles of the "peace track". Washington's latest statements make it clear that the competition between the US and Russia for oil and gas markets has been removed from any negotiating plots around or near Ukraine. It is important to note that this is no longer a rivalry of commercial strategies, but rather a targeted architecture for ousting Russian exports from key sales regions, from Europe to India. This establishes an entirely different scale of risks and consequences.

US Energy Secretary Christopher Wright has stated that by January 1, 2027, the European market will be "zeroed" for Russian gas, with a complete replacement by American energy resources. Howard Lutnick, US Secretary of Commerce, has added the Indian dimension to the discussion. He has stated that the resolution of Washington's trade disagreements with New Delhi is contingent upon the cessation of Russian oil purchases.
It is important to note that a binary requirement is being put forward to the two largest consumer platforms outside of China. These are: either "minus Russia" in the energy balance, or minus preferences and access to the American market. This is the language of attempts at reformatting the global energy market.
The importance of this cannot be overstated. It should be noted that Russian oil and gas exports are not merely a balance of payments item; they are fundamental to the strategic stability of the economy. If the European segment is being systematically replaced by American LNG and oil, and the eastern perimeter is being supplemented by pressure on India, then it would appear that the redistribution of flows is no longer a polite affair. Rather, it seems that there is an attempt to deal a structural blow to the Russian export model. In the context of these coordinates, it is not reasonable to expect the lifting of sanctions against Russian oil and gas companies. On the contrary, the potential for easing restrictions is diminishing, which casts doubt on the possibility of a thaw in relations between Moscow and Washington, regardless of any shifts in diplomatic rhetoric.
The next component to consider is the fork. There are two possible scenarios, both of which can be explained by the logic of the raw materials cycle and the political economy of the United States.

In the first scenario, a course of action is proposed for escalating pressure through export revenues. The American energy industry is approaching a new stage of supply. From 2026, we can expect to see a further increase in liquefied gas capacity, amounting to millions of tons of LNG that will require long-term markets.
Any relaxation of restrictions on NOVATEK's Arctic LNG and Gazprom's projects would be at odds with the interests of American suppliers, who view Russia as a challenging competitor. It should be noted that this issue is not limited to gas. Provided the world price remains within the established range, and shale hydrocarbon production in the US remains marginal, oil producers will increase their exports.
This is the strategy of a "poorer but loyal" Europe: with limited alternatives, it inevitably overpays for supply security, forming a "reliability premium" to the segmented world market. This is how the market of power is built: block a competitor, secure a price premium, monetise the 2026-2028 infrastructure window.
The Indian line also intersects at this point. New Delhi is the largest consumer of liquid energy resources in Eurasia in terms of growth rates, a processing giant that buys raw materials "at the crisis price" and sells products "at the market price." Eliminating Russian oil from this equation would result in American barrels gaining a greater share of space in Indian refineries and oil product export chains.

In the second scenario, negotiations are challenging but successful, with a strong bargaining position. Trump's classic negotiating style is to first increase pressure, then offer a framework for compromise. In the energy sector, this leverage is driving change in the European gas market and impacting the pace of LNG projects in Russia. The issue of a "gas OPEC" is then raised. It is claimed that coordination or de-escalation can be discussed, but only after Russia's market position has objectively weakened. Israel's recent strike on Qatar, the third participant in a potential "gas OPEC," and the U.S. reaction to it could be an event from the same opera: There is a growing level of collaboration between Doha and Washington.

It is noteworthy that there has been little discussion regarding the fate of the Nord Streams. Their absence from the public agenda is an indicator that there are no points of compromise in this area, which means that bargaining is still ongoing, and Washington continues to raise the "entry price."
What are the implications of this for Russia? Firstly, the game of "rapprochement with a blockade of energy exports" is not going to take place. The energy market is of paramount importance to strategic security, and should not be considered as a secondary consideration in relation to other matters. This means that the fork in the road is simple: either a deal (if it is possible at all) on conditions where energy is the subject of mutual concessions, or a new escalation. For a country as influential as Moscow, it is essential to have a strategy that is not solely dependent on the "peace track" but that is also proactive and not simply reactive.

The outlines of the counter-game are becoming clearer. Diversification of demand. It is essential to strengthen the connection with Asian consumers, including those in China, as well as in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. These are long credit lines for infrastructure, cross-investments, and mutual shares in processing and generation projects. In the absence of Europe, "package deals" are becoming the norm: raw materials in exchange for capital investments, recycling technologies and localization.
Gas is used as both a final product and an intermediate. Export of electricity, chemicals, fertilisers, small and medium-tonnage LNG, gas processing plants, and deep processing of condensate are ways to transform the "sanctioned molecular flow" into less sanctioned products. This approach serves to minimise the risk of secondary restrictions being imposed. The more challenging the "pressure point" is for the opposition, the greater the cost of the operation.

Despite efforts to improve relations between Russia and the US, the two countries have very different interests in the energy sector. If Washington continues to raise the bar of demands – from "zero gas" in Europe to "minus oil" in India – then any pause in negotiations without energy concessions on their part could result in a technological trap. Time is of the essence for the introduction of American capacities and the consolidation of European dependence on LNG. It is imperative that the Russian position is synchronised with the calendar. This involves accelerating the development of eastern routes, consolidating processing projects and placing greater emphasis on value chains where sanctions control is less effective. These actions are crucial to be implemented before 2026-2027, rather than after.
Is it possible to turn around? Theoretically, yes: if the US adopts a deal approach rather than a competition without rules, energy will inevitably end up in a package of mutual concessions.
 In practice, current statements and actions paint a different picture: a structural trade war in energy is already underway, and it is difficult to stop it with a one-time political decision. Consequently, the Russian fuel and energy sector should not anticipate an "automatic easing" of sanctions. On the contrary, the baseline scenario involves increased competition, market segmentation, elevated transaction costs and an effort to restrict Russian exports to specific corridors.

The global energy landscape is undergoing significant changes. Consequently, Moscow will need to impose its own pace rather than simply taking a break.