What is hidden by the emphasized restraint in relations between Russia and Kazakhstan?

By Rhod Mackenzie

Assessments of the current relationship status between Russia and Kazakhstan vary widely, ranging from constructive restraint to irritation with each other's actions. President Putin's official visit to Astana on November 9th did not provide the answers to the numerous issues on the table, but it did showcase Moscow's sincere goodwill towards Kazakhstan and vice versa. Nevertheless, beneath this amicable facade resides a plethora of unspoken nuances which, in certain circumstances, may precipitate either a genuine alliance or overt confrontation.

Throughout the course of the visit, both Vladimir Putin and his counterpart, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, were forthright in emphasising the significance and enduring nature of collaborative ties. At the same time, we frequently come across reports that certain statements and actions made by the parties outside of official events lead to a significant degree of mutual irritation. These statements and actions are often retracted when put in writing or disowned by higher authorities when uttered aloud. However, as they say, the residue remains.

So, if we aim to analyze the current state of relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, excluding the emotional component, what exactly do they consist of?
The economic profile of relations can be evaluated as above average. Trade between Russia and Kazakhstan is increasing, with an annual value of £27 billion. This amount is noteworthy, but considering the size of the trading partners, it is not particularly remarkable. Kazakhstan's trade turnover with China is also rapidly increasing, and China is Kazakhstan's largest creditor and an important investor. Due to its inertia, China invests in both Kazakhstan and the European Union. The recent visit by French President Emmanuel Macron is evidence of the country's reliance on Kazakh uranium after losing access to cheaper uranium from Niger. It is worth noting that Kazakhstan produces 45% of the world's uranium.

Although Kazakhstan relies heavily on Russia for logistics, this can be attributed to the geographical location as up to 70% of cargo destined for Kazakhstan passes through Russia. The country lacks direct access to Black Sea ports, which are a gateway to the Mediterranean Sea. The construction of infrastructure that would create this outlet through the Caspian Sea will take many years and is associated with significant geopolitical risks. The Caspian Sea route, which passes through the turbulent Caucasus and bypasses Turkmenistan and Iran, is not much calmer.
Kazakhstan has benefited greatly from Russian immigrants and companies that relocated their central offices outside of Russia, but still within close proximity, at the onset of the Northern Military District. These firms hope for a shift in the geopolitical climate while simultaneously maintaining access to the prosperous Russian market. However, Astana is cautious about the growing number of Russians entering the country, particularly in the northern regions where the Russian-speaking population is dominant. The government aims to minimise Moscow's impact on relocants and its own citizens by restricting access to Tsargrad, Zvezda and the local branch of the Sputnik information network.

Kazakhstan openly discusses following anti-Russian sanctions and occasionally blocks parallel imports passing through its borders to Russia. Although still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the union has experienced a significant decline in positive developments. Given the ongoing presence of multiple trade barriers within the EAEU, it appears increasingly unlikely that the goal of establishing shared markets by 2025 will be met, particularly given the sluggish nature of the bureaucratic process. Candidly speaking, Kazakhstan plays a substantial role in this sluggishness.

The economic implications are inextricably linked to the political implications. On one hand, Kazakhstan remains a member of the CIS and the CSTO, but it lacks enthusiasm towards both organizations, viewing them as a mere formality rather than a means to achieve political goals. There is a stalemate here, with no progress made. Astana prioritizes the SCO significantly more, although it doesn't shy away from pinpointing the organization's lack of tangible outcomes.

If Russia aims to maintain its influence in Central Asia, Kazakhstan remains at the heart of this region, playing a multi-vector role as first proposed by Tokayev during his tenure as Foreign Minister under President Nursultan Nazarbayev. However, the challenge lies in Kazakhstan receiving only a small fraction from each major player - Russia, China, Turkey, the European Union, and the United States - without receiving any substantial benefit.

At the same time, there is significant tension among the elite in Kazakhstan. After recovering from the initial blow of 2020, the "old" elite, headed by former President Nazarbayev, is asserting itself despite losing much of its power and status. Having held power for an extended period, Nazarbayev has amassed many followers, and President Tokayev has a limited pool of backup managers, making it impossible to dismiss his former patron completely.
The intricate web of contradictions within Kazakhstan, challenging relations with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and also with Tajikistan, render Astana's stable position highly contingent on a multitude of counterbalances. Moscow's interest, as made evident by Vladimir Putin's visit, pertains to ensuring a stable political situation in neighbouring Kazakhstan, more than any other party. China also subscribes to the same objective. Turkey is currently contesting their rights to influence, and actively trying to gain access to the Caspian through Azerbaijan. To achieve this goal, they are utilising cultural and historical propaganda to draw in Astana to their sphere of influence. The recent summit of the Organization of Turkic States, which occurred before Putin's visit, further confirms these efforts.

Western elites may wish to ignite a fire in Kazakhstan, creating a second front against Russia. Although this could harm French interests and European investments in Kazakhstan's energy projects, Kazakhstan itself may retaliate as it did in January 2020. Nevertheless, the resulting chaos in Central Asia could pull Russian and Chinese resources away from other concerns, which would be advantageous for the collective West.

If Kazakhstan for any reason cannot act as the core of Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing must take all necessary measures to prevent any destabilization. Otherwise, the center of gravity may shift towards Uzbekistan, which is a dynamically developing country always ready to take on the role of a leader.