By Lyudmila Filippova

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s March 2023 visit to Russia was followed by literally every leading news agency in the world. It attracted this attention in the context of possible progress in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the main results of the visit were within the framework of the existing bilateral agenda. One such outcome was the agreements reached on the development of cooperation in the Arctic between the two countries, which could have implications for the future of the entire Arctic region.

Given the similarity of Russia’s regional priorities and interests to those of other Arctic states, especially the other countries of the “Arctic Five”, Russia has typically given priority to interaction with Arctic rather than non-Arctic players in regional projects. Russian officials have consistently expressed confidence that all the basic “rules of the game” in the Arctic should be established by the eight Arctic states that are members of the Arctic Council, in full compliance with international law. As for relations with non-Arctic states with the status of observers in the Arctic Council, including China, they should be built on the principle of non-Arctic states respecting the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the countries of the Arctic Council, the historically established international legal regime of the region, as well as the culture, traditions and specific way of life of the indigenous peoples of the North.

However, the aggravation of relations between Russia and the West against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis led to the Russian “pivot to the East” policy, which at first received cautious continuation in the Arctic region. Anti-Russian sanctions have largely removed the previously existing fears about large-scale Arctic cooperation between Russia and non-regional players and actually contributed to the intensification of interaction in the Arctic between Russia and non-regional players, including China. In a sense, these changes have contributed to the sale of an additional 9.9% stake in the Yamal LNG project to the Chinese Silk Road Fund (in addition to the 20% stake previously sold to CNPC), and the success of the first project to lay the foundation for China’s participation in the Arctic LNG-2 project.

As a result, the Chinese have obtained almost 30% in the Yamal LNG project and 20% in the Arctic LNG-2 project, which has allowed the Russian company NOVATEK to attract long-term borrowed funds for the development of the project on favourable terms. In exchange, in addition to direct investment income, the Chinese side received access to natural resources and the ability to import the raw materials it can extract independently. China is also successfully increasing the export of its technologies for the Arctic projects: as part of the implementation of Yamal LNG, Beijing has supplied its technological modules for the production of liquefied natural gas for the needs of the project; Chinese drilling rig installations have already been repeatedly used on the Arctic shelf of Russia. Nevertheless, for a long time, Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic was limited mainly to multilateral commercial projects and some interaction in the scientific and education sphere.

The current level of relations between Russia and China in the Arctic contrasts significantly with what it was just a few years ago. During China’s historic Fifth Arctic Scientific Expedition in 2012, the icebreaker Snow Dragon (雪龙, Xue Long) made its first passage through the Northern Sea Route. However, the expedition made history for another reason — Russia banned Chinese scientists from conducting marine research while passing through the Northern Sea Route. In 2020, charges of high treason benefitting China were brought against a well-known Russian scientist, Arctic Academy of Sciences President Valery Mitko. In 2021, when holding a tender for the construction of new Russian icebreakers, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia strongly opposed the participation of Chinese shipyards in the project: The transfer of design documentation for the icebreaker to China was called unacceptable, since Russia would be competing with a partner in Arctic developments.

The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine and the large-scale sanctions policy of Western countries against Moscow have consolidated the “pivot to the East” in the country’s Arctic policy. In the context of the suspension by other Arctic states of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council, where Russia has continued its chairmanship since 2021, in the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, the trend towards increasing the presence of China in the Arctic will presumably only intensify in the Northern Dimension format in the Council of Ministers of the Northern States. And even if their work is resumed in the same Arctic Council, where Russia’s partners will now be not five, but seven NATO countries, the future of the existing formats of multilateral cooperation in the Arctic is jeopardised.

This assumption is confirmed in the changes to the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2035, which Russian President Vladimir Putin approved in February 2023 shortly before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia. If in the 2020 version, the task was to “strengthen good-neighbourly relations with the Arctic states on a bilateral basis and within the framework of multilateral regional cooperation formats, including the Arctic Council, the coastal Arctic five’ and the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region”, now Russia’s priority in external Arctic relations has become “development of relations with foreign states on a bilateral basis, within the framework of appropriate multilateral structures and mechanisms.” In other words, Russia officially declares that it is hardly ready to characterise current relations with its Arctic neighbours as “good neighbourhood”, and also sees the future of international cooperation in the region with a wider range of countries. In addition, the failure to mention in the Fundamentals such established formats as the Arctic Council, the Arctic five and others in favour of a broad definition of “relevant multilateral structures and mechanisms” cannot rule out Russia’s plans to create new institutions of regional interaction. In the current circumstances it could be useful, primarily with the participation of individual non-Arctic states (China, India, etc.) — especially if the format of the “Arctic Seven” is institutionalised by Western countries (without the participation of Russia).

These changes in one of Russia’s key Arctic documents laid the foundation for the agreements reached by the leaders of Russia and China during the summit in Moscow in March 2023. A joint statement about partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era, published during the visit, was concluded with the words: “The parties stand for the preservation of the Arctic as a territory of peace, stability and constructive cooperation,” suggesting a further deepening of the dialogue between Moscow and Beijing on the Arctic issues. However, much more significant was the mention of the decision which was not included in any of the joint statements, but was voiced by Russian President Vladimir Putin during the negotiations: “We consider cooperation with Chinese partners in developing the transit potential of the Northern Sea Route to be promising. As I said, we are ready to create a joint working body for the development of the Northern Sea Route.”

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) has a special place in the system of priorities of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic, especially in the context of the development of the Polar Silk Road and the wider Belt and Road Initiative. The development of the Northern Sea Route is of particular importance both for China as the largest consignor and recipient of goods transported by sea, and for Russia in the context of the tasks of modernising its infrastructure (and the need to attract foreign investment), increasing the cargo turnover along the route (at least to the level the designated and not yet achieved target of 80 million tonnes) and the transformation of the Northern Sea Route from a national transport artery into an international transport corridor.

Even a few years ago, at a time when voices were already being heard from both sides that bilateral relations had reached an “unprecedentedly high level” and the above tasks did not sound less acute, it was impossible to assume that Russia would allow China to participate in decision-making regarding the further development of the NSR. However, bilateral cooperation is now developing rapidly. Just a month after the visit of the President of the People’s Republic of China to Russia, in late April 2023, the two countries also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on strengthening law enforcement cooperation at sea between the Federal Security Service of Russia and the Chinese Maritime Police Administration, and for the first time the Chinese delegation was able to join as observers of the large-scale exercises in the Barents Sea: “Arctic Patrol — 2023”.

In a sense, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia summed up the Russian chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021-2023, which, due to the boycott of Western countries, did not allow either Russia or the institution itself to play the role that they are capable of and lead to the emergence of new multilateral Arctic projects that are beneficial to all parties. However, against this background, the role of China and the growing Russian-Chinese vector of cooperation in the region have become much more noticeable. If earlier the main concerns about the prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic were that China, which has only the status of an observer state in the AC, would begin to build its policy in the Arctic through “separate” cooperation with individual Arctic states or within the framework of associations with other non-regional players, now the question is much more acute. The continuing Western boycott of constructive dialogue with Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, will only further push Russia into the “Arctic embrace” of China, contributing to the deepening of Russian-Chinese cooperation and increasing the presence of Beijing in the region.

The beginning of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine consolidated the “pivot to the East” in the country’s Arctic policy. The interaction between Russia and China on the development of the Arctic region is becoming one of the important areas of Russian-Chinese relations of “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era”. China now has a historical chance to become Russia’s new priority partner in the implementation of Arctic projects. With Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit, Russia marked the beginning of the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow in the strategic areas of Arctic cooperation, which hardly can be stopped. However, its speed of development will largely depend on the readiness of other Arctic states to protect the Arctic agenda from the influence of a broader global political agenda and return to a constructive dialogue within the traditional institutions of multilateral cooperation.

Lyudmila Filippova - Senior Researcher at the ‘Russia, China, World’ Centre of the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

This article orginally appeared at the Valdai Discussion Club